



Embracing the science of socio-technical design

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Human Factors & Patient Safety Seminar, 6 Dec 2007
NHMRC Centre of Research Excellence in Patient Safety


Background: ICT for patient safety

- Information and communication technologies (ICT) are a central component of efforts to improve health care quality and patient safety
- Computerised order entry and test result reporting a key safety intervention
 - medications, pathology, imaging, cardiology
- Promising results of improvements to patient safety, but there is a long way to go
- Evidence that ICT systems may also harm patients

Growing evidence that ICT contributes to clinical error

- US Pharmacopeia (2004): recorded a steady growth in ICT errors, **one** in **five** medication errors linked to computer use; 78% of computer errors linked to distractions
- Koppel et al. (2005): 22 types of ICT-related medication errors
- Han et al. (2005): mortality rate increased from 2.8% to 6.6% on introduction of computer order entry

Analysing socio-technical systems



Rule 1: Safety interventions have social consequences

- Doctor's use of a desktop computer resulted in:
 - shortened and delayed responses to patient
 - patients tried to judge when to talk based upon Drs interactions with the computer(Greatbatch et al. 1993)
- Computerised physician order entry changed communication patterns and practices
 - reduced staff face-to-face interactions for patient care
 - miscommunication, delays in initiation and execution of orders(Campbell et al. 2007)
- Bar coded medications administration reduced co-ordination of care (Patterson et al. 2002)

after Coiera E. **Four rules for the reinvention of health care** BMJ, 2004. 328



Rule 2: Social systems have safety consequences

- Clinical leadership is key to successful implementation of ICT to improve patient safety
- Uptake of online evidence systems in NSW hospitals linked to:
 - local champions
 - innovative teams
 - culture supporting evidence-based practiceGosling et al. (2003)
- New safety interventions more likely to work in organisations with an existing safety culture

after Coiera (2004)

Rule 3: We don't design safety interventions, we design socio-technical systems

- Patient safety interventions at the point of care
 - electronic prescribing
 - decision support
- Medication **ordering** errors linked to 56% of ADEs and potential ADEs (Bates et al. 1995)
- Some desirable attributes
 - support collaborative decision-making
 - facilitate Drs' interactions with pharmacy
 - location of computers relative to patient and clinical team
 - allow safe recovery from interruptions
- We must focus design on preserving and improving the most safety-critical interactions

after Coiera (2004)


Rule 4: To design socio-technical systems we must understand how people and safety interventions interact

- Clinical task and complexity
- Human skills and cognitive limits
 - time
 - workload
- Environment
- Work process
- Organisational policy and safety culture


after Coiera (2004)

Example: modelling user interactions to add a new medication

- >text input name >hit enter or click on search button
- >**select** name from list
- >**select** form from list
- >**select** frequency from drop down menu, PRN
- >text enter minimum dosage interval
- >**select** interval unit from drop down list
- >text enter maximum dosage
- >**select** dose/mg from drop down list
- >text enter maximum dosage interval
- >**select** interval unit from drop down list
- >click on continue






Use of working memory in typical prescribing task interactions



Prescribing process and task interactions

PROCESS ERROR CHAIN



TASK INTERACTIONS

Agents


P- pharmacist
N- nurse

R- resident
S- specialist
T- patient

Roles

I- inform D- decide
A- act C- communicate

Organisational policy and safety culture



Embracing the science of socio-technical design

1. Patient safety interventions have **social** consequences
2. Social systems have **safety** consequences
3. We don't design safety interventions, we design socio-technical systems
4. To design socio-technical systems we must understand how people and safety interventions interact

Acknowledgements

1. Prof. Ric Day
*Clinical Pharmacology & Toxicology,
St. Vincent's Hospital, University of New South Wales, Sydney*

2. Research supported by:
 - ARC Discovery Project Grant (DP0772487)
Engineering safe decision support systems for healthcare

 - ARC Linkage Grant (LP0775532)
*Agent-based methods for communication system design in
complex organizations*
APDI Fellowship: Magrabi

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Clinical Systems Safety Engineering @ UNSW

- To understand how decision support may cause harm
- To develop design principles and methods that ensure safety
- To drive safety standards and accreditation
- To actually design exemplar safer systems which minimise the impact of human error and system failures.
- To explore specific theoretical approaches from novel ***accident models*** to ***cognitive load theory*** in support of this work.

